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Abstract 
Does the low wage sector serve as a stepping stone towards integration into better-
paid jobs or at least towards integration of jobless people into employment? There is 
evidence for a “low-wage trap” and for a high risk of low-wage earners to get unem-
ployed, but this may also be due to sorting effects and not to low-wage work itself. 
We want to contribute to this debate and analyse employment spells of male low-
wage earners, who had been unemployed before, with methods of continuous-time 
event history analysis. Our data have been retrieved from two large administrative 
micro-data sources: The IAB employment sample (IABS) for Germany, and a com-
bination of social security data from the Austrian Social Insurance Institutions with 
information on registered unemployment from the public employment service for 
Austria. We focus on two possible exits of low-wage spells: Exits to higher-paid em-
ployment (upward mobility vs. persistence), and exits to unemployment (“no-pay-
low-pay cycle”). The results show shorter spell durations in Austria, pointing to a 
considerably higher fluctuation and labour turnover in the Austrian labour market. 
We investigate the influence of individual and firm-related characteristics and of the 
individual unemployment history on exit probabilities and the role of duration de-
pendence in both countries. With regard to upward mobility, we find no convincing 
evidence for “true” duration dependence, at least for Germany. As to the risk of fal-
ling back into unemployment, our results suggest that even low-wage workers can 
accumulate job-related human capital favouring employment integration over time. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Können Niedriglohnjobs für Arbeitslose als Sprungbrett in besser bezahlte Tätigkei-
ten oder zumindest als Brücke in eine dauerhafte Beschäftigungsintegration fungie-
ren? Zwar deuten empirische Befunde auf die Existenz einer „Niedriglohnfalle“ und 
auf ein hohes Risiko von Geringverdienern hin, arbeitslos zu werden, aber das kann 
auch an Sortiereffekten liegen und nicht an Niedriglohnbeschäftigung per se. Wir 
möchten einen Beitrag zu dieser Thematik leisten und analysieren Beschäftigungs-
episoden von männlichen Niedriglohnbeziehern, die zuvor arbeitslos gewesen wa-
ren, mit Methoden der Ereignisanalyse. Unsere Daten stammen aus zwei großen 
administrativen Mikro-Datensätzen: der IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe (IABS) und 
kombinierten Daten der Sozialversicherungsträger und der Arbeitsverwaltung in 
Österreich. Wir untersuchen zwei mögliche alternative Beendigungen von Niedrig-
lohn-Beschäftigungsepisoden: zum einen Übergänge in besser bezahlte Beschäfti-
gung und zum anderen Rückkehr in Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
die Niedriglohnepisoden in Österreich kürzer als in Deutschland sind, was auf eine 
höhere Arbeitskräftefluktuation in Österreich hindeutet. Wir untersuchen den Ein-
fluss von individuellen und firmenbezogenen Merkmalen und der vorhergehenden 
individuellen Arbeitsmarktbiographie auf die Übergangswahrscheinlichkeiten sowie 
den Einfluss der Dauerabhängigkeit in beiden Ländern. Im Hinblick auf die Auf-
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stiegschancen in besser bezahlte Jobs finden wir keine überzeugende Evidenz für 
„echte“ negative Dauerabhängigkeit, zumindest in Deutschland. Ferner deuten un-
sere Befunde darauf hin, dass auch Niedriglohnbeschäftigte Humankapital akkumu-
lieren können und somit ihr Rückkehrrisiko in Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf vermin-
dern können. 
 
JEL classification: J64, J63, J31 
Keywords: unemployment dynamics, low wage, duration dependence, duration 
analysis 
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1 Introduction 
With high and rising unemployment levels, European labour market institutions have 
often been blamed for being too rigid. High levels of employment protection and 
centralised wage bargaining are supposed to prevent more low-wage jobs that could 
bring unemployed people back into jobs - especially those who are low-skilled or 
have other competitive disadvantages. 
On the other hand, a growing low-wage sector may also increase the share of the 
“working poor”, which in Continental Europe is still low, compared to the US. More-
over, previous evidence1
With our paper, we want to contribute to clarify this issue and take a closer look at 
the dynamics of low wage employment in two European countries. More specifically, 
we focus on persons entering low-paid jobs out of unemployment and investigate if 
(and for whom) these jobs serve as a stepping stone towards better-paid jobs or at 
least do provide a stable integration into employment. We consider two alternative 
outcomes of low-wage spells: 1. upward mobility to better-paid jobs and 2. return to 
unemployment. Results are compared against a third possibility, which is persis-
tence of low-wage employment. The first two outcomes can be labelled as positive 
respectively negative from the perspective of labour market policy, whereas this is 
less clear in the case of persistence: Persisting in a low-wage job at least provides 
for employment integration and may be appropriate for persons with low skills and 
productivity potentials. However, this is less the case for high skilled workers. More-
over the income level remains low, in many cases not much above preceding un-
employment-related benefits. In any case, both upward mobility and persistence in 
low-wage employment can be considered as employment integration. 
 has shown that low-wage jobs are often unstable and the 
low paid are exposed to the risk of becoming unemployed and/or fluctuating be-
tween low-paid jobs and unemployment. Furthermore, those who have been in em-
ployment for a longer time have only limited chances to get into better-paid jobs. So 
it is still unclear if, and to what extent, the low pay sector serves as a stepping stone 
towards better-paid jobs or at least towards lasting integration of jobless people into 
employment. 
Although the issues of low-wage persistence and of the so-called no-pay-low pay 
cycle have already been investigated in previous studies, our paper is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first one that focuses on low-wage spells started out of unem-
ployment and that applies methods of competing risk analysis (duration analysis) to 
provide answers to the following questions: 
1. How likely are exits to higher wage and to unemployment, and how fast do these 
transitions take place? 
                                               
1  See OECD (1996 and 2003), and Stewart (2007) for Britain; evidence for Germany is 
presented in Eichhorst et al. (2005) and Schank et al. (2009). 
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2. Which observable individual and firm-related characteristics favour one of these 
two exits? 
We use pooled data on low-wage spells started between 1998 and 2004. A low 
wage is defined as being below two thirds of the median wage - the most commonly 
used low wage threshold in the literature. In order to reduce the heterogeneity of our 
data, we confine the analysis to males in the main working age (25-54 years). We 
also have to deal with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity: Beyond observable 
characteristics, individuals may also differ in unobservable characteristics such as 
ability or motivation. Not taking these factors into account may bias the results. We 
use information on the labour market history of individuals preceding each relevant 
job spell to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Details will be explained below. 
Moreover, this is a cross-country study including Germany and Austria, since we 
expect institutional factors to play a role for the outcomes. Although both countries 
are often labelled as highly regulated continental welfare states, the Austrian labour 
market is characterised by a higher degree of flexibility and deregulation, especially 
with regard to employment protection. 
We start with some theoretical considerations in section 2 and an overview on pre-
vious evidence in section 3. Afterwards we provide some stylised facts about labour 
market institutions and developments in both countries in section 4. We describe out 
datasets and data-selection and explain our estimation strategy in sections 5 and 6. 
We present descriptive evidence in section 7 and our multivariate estimation results 
in section 8, and conclude in section 9. 
2 Theoretical considerations 
Which arguments do support the bridge function towards better-paid jobs, which 
arguments let expect the negative outcome of falling back into unemployment? In a 
first step, we consider the possibility of upward mobility. Why should low-wage jobs 
serve as a bridge towards better-paid jobs, either within the firm or with a firm 
change? One argument can be derived from contract theory2
                                               
2  For an overview of contract theory, see Cahuc/Zylberberg (2004), chapter 5. 
: Before the start of an 
employment relationship, there is asymmetric information on skills and abilities of 
employees. So firms may use lower-paid jobs for the “screening” of newly hired 
workers. Screening also refers to the ability to learn and acquire firm-specific human 
capital. Provided that newly hired workers prove themselves, they are promoted to 
better-paid jobs. Unemployed persons with a higher skill level should be more likely 
to take such jobs than the low skilled, since higher formal skills should also facilitate 
the acquisition of firm-specific human capital, so we should expect more transitions 
to better-paid jobs for the higher skilled. Moreover, such transitions should be more 
likely within larger firms, since they usually have big internal labour markets with 
promotion ladders and a higher complexity and variety of firm-specific tasks (Schank 
et al. 2009). 
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Besides promotion chances within the firm, low-wage jobs may also offer insight into 
job opportunities at other firms, and better chances to get such jobs than out of un-
employment, which may be a bad signal for potential employers. 
However there are also arguments against the “bridge” scenario. From previous 
research it is known that low wage jobs are often also low-quality jobs. The distinc-
tion between low-paid and higher-paid jobs can be considered as one dimension of 
the “good” and “bad” jobs distinction (Stewart 2007; Acemoglu 2001). These low-
quality jobs offer poor opportunities to acquire general or firm-specific human capi-
tal3
Now we turn to the outcome of falling back into unemployment. In accordance with 
the segmentation theory (Piore/Doeringer 1971), low-wage jobs are mostly part of a 
secondary segment of unstable and insecure low-quality jobs. These jobs have low 
work requirements and offer few or no possibilities to acquire job-specific human 
capital. Firms use these jobs to as a buffer to adapt to demand or supply shocks or 
to seasonal fluctuations. So we should find such jobs more frequently in sectors with 
high fluctuations, such as the primary sector, construction or tourism-related activi-
ties; and more often in smaller and younger firms, which are known to have higher 
rates of labour turnover than larger and older firms (Davis/Haltiwanger 1999). In 
addition, low skilled workers should be overrepresented in these jobs. 
. Besides, being in a “bad” job may be a frustrating and discouraging experience, 
with negative effects on work effort and promotion chances. So being in a “bad” job 
should limit or prevent upward wage mobility within the firm, and could also be inter-
preted as a bad sign by other potential employers, because “employers offering 
good jobs may well use a person’s current position as a screening device. While 
unemployment is a bad signal, being in a low-quality job may well be a worse one” 
(Layard et al. 1991, p. 249). 
Interestingly, low-paid jobs with low work requirements do not necessarily fulfil a 
buffer function. Especially within larger firms, they are also indispensable for the 
internal division of work. More generally, recent research on the development of the 
occupational structure has shown that technological change in the last decades has 
not diminished the need for jobs with “easy” tasks, although the content of these 
jobs tends to shift away from routine tasks towards non-routine tasks (see Autor et 
al. (2003) for the U.S.; Spitz-Oener (2006) for Germany). So beyond the buffer func-
tion there is a constant and continued need for workers fulfilling such easy tasks. 
The arguments presented above lend no clear support for or against the “bridge” 
scenario, nor do they unambiguously back the “no-pay-low-pay-cycle” argument. So 
a careful look at the empirical evidence seems advisable. 
                                               
3  This is corroborated by the fact that low-wage workers get less training than the higher-
paid. 
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3 Previous evidence 
In a comparative study, the OECD (2003) analysed the dynamics of low-wage dy-
namics in 11 European countries and the U.S. over the years 1994-1999 with data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). Individuals observed in low-wage jobs were selected and 
their employment careers were followed over the next five years. The study found 
considerable evidence for low-pay traps and instability. “In both Europe and the 
United States, workers low paid in the first year averaged nearly four of the next five 
years in either non-employment or low-paid employment (with non-employment ac-
counting for more than a year…)” (p. 95). It concludes that “relatively few workers 
are persistently trapped in low-paid jobs, but a substantially greater number cycle 
between low pay and non-employment…” (p. 95). However, the analysis is purely 
descriptive and does not control for the individual employment biography preceding 
the start of the low wage job, nor does it provide comparative evidence for individu-
als observed in higher-paid jobs. 
Two studies for Britain (Cappellari/Jenkins 2004, and Stewart 2007) and a study for 
Germany (Uhlendorff 2006) investigate the dynamics of low-wage employment in 
more detail. They present descriptive evidence on low-wage persistence and the 
risk of unemployment and find a considerable degree of persistence as well as a 
much higher risk for the low paid to get unemployed than for the higher paid. But 
these studies go a step further and analyse whether unfavourable outcomes are due 
to state dependence or to endogenous self-selection of individuals into low-wage 
jobs. State dependence means that the mere fact of being low paid4
                                               
4  In labour economics, the term “state dependence” was first used (in the 1980s) to ana-
lyse the persistence of unemployment. For a review of this literature, see Arulampalam et 
al. (2000). 
 influences fu-
ture labour market prospects negatively. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) use a multi-
variate probit model for transitions between low pay, higher pay and unemployment, 
taking endogenous selection into account. They conclude that there is state de-
pendence and that low-wage earners have a higher probability to become unem-
ployed than higher-wage earners. Stewart (2007) obtains similar results by using a 
range of dynamic random and fixed effects estimators whose results differ only 
slightly. He concludes that low-wage employment has almost as large an adverse 
effect as unemployment on future prospects and the difference in their effects is 
insignificant, and that low-wage jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemploy-
ment and considerably increases its probability. Uhlendorff (2006), using multinomial 
logit panel models with random effects, also finds evidence for state dependence 
and for a “low pay no pay cycle” for west German men, but finds that being low paid 
improves future employment prospects, compared to being unemployed. Mosthaf et 
al. (2009) reach a similar conclusion for women in West Germany. 
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At this point, it is helpful to consider the kind of panel data used in the analysis of the 
dynamics of low-wage employment. Two types of samples are conceivable: 
1. Stock samples, i.e. persons observed in low paid jobs at a given point in time, 
and 
2. Inflow (or spell) samples, i.e. persons taking up low paid jobs during a given time 
span. 
In both cases, subsequent employment careers are analysed (and can be compared 
to the career of higher wage earners). 
The above-mentioned studies use stock samples. This is due to the fact that both 
the BHPS and the GSOEP are not large enough5
For the analysis of employment dynamics, inflow samples into low-wage employ-
ment seem to be more appropriate. There is no left censoring in these samples, and 
the problem of initial conditions, though not completely discarded, is strongly re-
duced. This is why we use administrative datasets, which are large enough to allow 
spell sampling. We are also able to circumvent or at least greatly reduce two addi-
tional sources of endogenous selection in survey datasets
 to yield sufficient inflow numbers 
for spell samples. But when using stock samples, the problem of left censoring 
arises, which is closely related to the problem of “initial conditions” (Heckman 1981): 
The initial state of a person (in our case: being in low-wage employment) is not in-
dependent of his/her preceding employment history. This leads to a sample selec-
tion bias, and the subsequent employment career cannot only be explained by ob-
servable characteristics. The studies using BHPS and GSOEP data are well aware 
of this problem and use various econometric techniques to control for initial condi-
tions. 
6
Up until now, there are many cross-country studies based on micro data from stan-
dardized international household survey panels, such as the ECHP or the CNEF
, that is panel attrition 
(which is non-existent in administrative data) and item non-response. In survey pan-
els, information on income and wages is sometimes not provided by respondents 
and is generally less precise and reliable than in administrative data. So our data 
offer considerable advantages and allow the application of duration analysis of job 
spells. 
7
                                               
5  For the years considered in our analysis, the average number of adult respondents per 
year was clearly below 20,000 per year in each dataset. 
; 
but international comparisons based on administrative data are extremely rare. This 
6  For an exhaustive discussion of sources of endogenous selection in survey panels, see 
Cappellari / Jenkins (2008). 
7  ECHP = European Household Community Panel, a household survey with longitudinal 
data for fourteen European Countries 1994-2001; CNEF = Cross National Equivalent File, 
with similar data for Germany, the UK, the US, Canada and Australia; the German data 
are from the GSOEP. 
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is partly because in many countries administrative data are not available to re-
searchers for reasons of data privacy, or because the data are inappropriate for em-
pirical analysis and not comparable across countries, since they were not gathered 
for research purposes. So our cross-country analysis based on administrative data 
sources should be of interest also from a methodological point of view. 
4 Comparing Austria and Germany 
With regard to labour market institutions, Austria and Germany display many com-
mon features. In Esping-Andersen’s influential typology of welfare states (1990) both 
countries are classified as “continental” or “conservative” welfare states. It is true 
that in recent years, Germany has implemented various reforms, especially the so-
called Hartz laws, which constitute a departure from this welfare state model. But for 
the period under investigation, most relevant institutions were similar in both coun-
tries, such as wage setting procedures, tax and social security systems, replace-
ment rates for the unemployed, and the dual system of vocational training. But there 
is one difference that might be relevant for the quantitative importance and the char-
acteristics of low wage employment: Employment protection is more “liberal” in Aus-
tria than in Germany.8
The general labour market situation in both countries should also be considered. 
During the 90s, after a short “post-unification boom” the economy in the unified 
Germany suffered from the deep crisis in the New Länder. Real GDP growth was 
only modest up to 1997 (1.4 %), then started to rise in 1998 and peaked at 3.0 % in 
2000. After that year, the so-called “new-economy-crisis” caused growth rates to fall 
to 0.7 % (yearly average for 2001-2004). 
 It is not easy to identify the influence of employment protec-
tion in the data, since we cannot distinguish temporary contracts from “standard” 
permanent contracts. So, if a spell ends in unemployment, we cannot be sure 
whether there is a layoff or just the expiration of a temporary contract. However, the 
results should allow at least tentative conclusions in this regard. 
Unemployment rates rose sharply in the early 90s, were at 8.2 % in 1995 and con-
tinued to rise to 9.9 % (1997), then dropped to 7.8 % (2001, all rates according to 
ILO standards). Total employment mirrored this trend and started to rise after 1997, 
but declined after 2001. So the years 1998-2001 were somewhat more favourable 
for job-starters out of unemployment than the following years. 
Economic trends in Austria were similar, reflecting the close economic ties with 
Germany. The country had relatively high GDP growth rates of around 3 % between 
1998 and 2000 and suffered a downturn in 2001 with growth rates of around 1 % 
between 2001 and 2003. But unemployment rates were much lower than in Ger-
                                               
8  Although many legal stipulations of dismissal law were (and still are) similar between 
Germany and Austria, dismissals are de facto easier to push through in Austria, since the 
employee has less chances to contest it with legal action. In Germany, dismissals are of-
ten contested, leading to court procedures and (in many cases) to dismissal payments, 
which makes dismissals more expensive for employers. 
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many and declined from 4.5 % (1997) to 3.6 % (2000) and then increased again to 
4.3 % in 2003. 
To sum up, economic trends in the two countries were similar. But the labour market 
situation, in terms of unemployment rates, was clearly better in Austria. However our 
analysis refers only to West Germany, whereas the unemployment figures given 
above refer to Germany as a whole. Standardized unemployment rates are not pub-
lished separately for West and East Germany. But when comparing “official” rates 
based on registered unemployment, West German rates were between 1 and 2 per-
centage points below the national average. From this we can infer that the labour 
market situation in Austria was far better than in Germany as a whole, but also 
clearly better than in West Germany. 
5 Data and sample selection 
For Germany, we use the so-called weakly anonymised version 1975-2004 of the 
IAB Employment Sample (IABS), containing information on the employment history 
(including wages) of employees liable to social security on a daily basis9
For Austria, we use a similar dataset based on social insurance data, offering de-
tailed longitudinal and cross section information for dependent employment spells 
and unemployment spells. These data from the Austrian Social Security Database 
contain detailed (anonymised) information on individual employment, unemployment 
on a daily basis as well as earnings histories, public pension contributions and al-
lowances since 1972 and also basic employer information.
. The IABS 
is a 2 % sample drawn from the IAB employee history supplemented by information 
on unemployment benefit recipients, the IAB recipient history. The sample covers a 
continuous flow of data on employment subject to social security as well as on re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and maintenance allow-
ance; therefore, it is highly suitable for performing analyses on the employee and 
benefit recipient history. It also contains a number of establishment characteristics. 
10 These matched em-
ployer-employee data cover the essentials of the Austrian labour market because of 
their nearly universal coverage. This database is combined with information on un-
employment spells registered at the public employment service (since 1998).11
However, some limitations of both datasets must be taken into account. First, the 
German data do not cover self-employed persons and civil servants, but only em-
ployees liable to social security contributions. Second, when people are out of em-
ployment, we can observe them only if they are in registered unemployment and 
 Due 
to their administrative character both data-sources are highly reliable. 
                                               
9  For more information on IABS, see http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Individual_Data.aspx. 
10  See also Hofer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) for a description. 
11  At the Austrian Institute of Economic Research these anonymised administrative data are 
processed, validated and systematised within the INDI-DV Group (see Schöberl 2004). 
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receive unemployment benefits or maintenance allowance (in Germany)12
The Austrian dataset completely lacks the information on whether a worker is em-
ployed full time or part time. This made it necessary to identify full-time workers with 
imputation procedures
. Third, 
IABS data allow distinguishing between full-time and part-time employment, but do 
not contain information on working hours. This is why we do not consider part time 
employees. 
13
We construct comparable datasets for both countries according to the following 
rules: 
. Wages as the basis of social security contributions are top 
coded because of the social security contribution cap (about 10 % of the cases). 
We use information on wages for West German full-time workers aged between 18 
and 60 years to calculate a low wage threshold of two thirds of the median wage for 
each year between 1998 and 2004. We then construct a sample of low-wage spells 
starting out of unemployment during this period. For Austria, we do this for the pe-
riod 1998-2003. In order to reduce the heterogeneity of the sample, the spell sam-
ples only include males aged between 25 and 54 years at the time of inflow, and, in 
the case of Germany, only West German men14
1. have a minimum duration of 30 days, and 
. As further restrictions, only those 
low-wage spells are included that 
2. are preceded by a spell of unemployment of at least two weeks. 
With these two restrictions, we try to exclude short-lived spells and correct for “artifi-
cial” fluctuation, i.e. quick changes between different labour market states that do 
not reflect sustainable transitions between unemployment and employment. In our 
understanding, a low-wage spell continues if the employee changes the employer 
but still remains in low pay. Put differently: A firm change terminates the spell only in 
the case the wage in the new firm is above the low-wage threshold. 
This selection leaves us with a sample of 24,160 spells in Germany and 160,843 in 
the Austrian dataset, started by 17,876 males in Germany and 74,777 in Austria. 
The number of persons is lower than the number of spells, since one person may 
have more than one spell in the period under investigation. As to possible exits, we 
distinguish between 1. full-time higher-wage employment (above the low-wage 
threshold), 2. unemployment, and 3. “other”, including part-time employment as well 
                                               
12  This allowance (“Unterhaltsgeld”) is paid to unemployed persons participating in training 
measures, instead of unemployment benefits (“Arbeitslosengeld” or “Arbeitslosenhilfe”). 
13  Since this analysis is limited to 25 to 54 years old men outside the public services, who 
show an extremely low part time share, this problem is of minor relevance. 
14  Confining the analysis to males also reduces the influence of possible data errors on the 
part-time/full-time distinction (part-time jobs wrongly classified as full-time), since part-
time jobs play only a minor role for men in both countries. 
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as men dropping out of the sample for various reasons15
We then repeat this sampling procedure for higher-wage spells (above the low wage 
threshold) starting out of unemployment during the same period, with 1. low wage 
employment, 2. unemployment and 3. “other” as possible exits. This allows us to 
draw further conclusions on the low-pay-no-pay cycle - we expect that a “higher-
pay-no-pay cycle” is of minor importance. In Germany, there were 52,805 such 
higher-wage spells, making up 69 % of all full-time spells started out of unemploy-
ment. For Austria we observe 828,480 higher-wage spells, making up 84 % of all 
full-time spells of males aged 25-54. 
. Since “other” is a very 
heterogeneous category in our case, we do not look at this exit in detail, but confine 
our analysis to the exits 1 and 2. We consider a low-wage spell as terminated only if 
it is interrupted for more than two weeks. For Germany, if low-wage spells persist up 
to the end of the year 2004, we follow them up to the end of 2007, but we do not 
include new inflows after 2004. In Austria, low-wage spells persisting up to the end 
of the year 2003 will be followed until 2006. 
6 Estimation strategy: Hazard rates, (un)observed hetero-
geneity and duration dependence 
We carry out independent competing-risk estimations of the low-wage spells for the 
exits “Upward mobility” and “Return to unemployment”16. Such competing risk mod-
els are typically used for the analysis of employment spells, e.g. in the case of tem-
porary jobs (recent examples are D’Addio/Rosholm 2005 and Gash 2008)17
                                               
15  Exits into higher-wage jobs (1.) or unemployment (2.) are only counted as such if the 
spells have a minimum duration of two weeks and have started not later than two weeks 
after the end of the low-wage spell. Otherwise exits are counted as “other”. This is done 
in order to reduce the “noise” in the data, caused by changes of employment status im-
mediately after the end of a low-wage spell. 
. For 
each exit, the duration of spells is modelled by specifying the hazard rate, that is the 
conditional probability of leaving the spell. Hazard rates are estimated with a non-
parametric proportional hazards model. If we compare hazard rates for the two exits, 
we obtain information on which of the two exits prevails. However, high hazard rates 
for the exit unemployment do not necessarily imply that this is correlated with low 
wages, but frequent returns to unemployment may occur regardless of the wage 
level. Therefore we also analyse higher-wage spells started out of unemployment. 
For these spells, we should expect the hazard rates for the exit “Return to unem-
ployment” to be lower than for low-wage spells. Only in this case can we speak of a 
distinct no-pay-low-pay cycle. 
16  Because we focus on these two outcomes, other exit possibilities, such as transitions to 
self-employment or to non-activity, are not explicitly taken into account. Moreover, our 
data do not provide sufficient information in these cases. 
17  Like low wage jobs, temporary jobs are also frequently analysed under the “bridge” as-
pect (transition to permanent jobs vs. return to unemployment). 
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Furthermore we investigate the influence of observed characteristics of individuals 
and firms that are likely to affect exit probabilities. The expected influence of skill 
level, firm size and firm age on exit behaviour has already been discussed above. 
Furthermore, we include the worker’s age at the begin of a job spell as independent 
variable, since we expect that age should especially influence the exit probabilities 
to higher-paid jobs. We expect that upward mobility decreases with age, since age-
earnings profiles are generally steeper in younger years (Schank et al. 2009). We 
also control for nationality, because foreign workers, especially from non-EU-15-
countries, are often employed in unstable jobs with poor promotion prospects, partly 
as a result of discrimination, partly due to insufficient language skills. Moreover, we 
include information on the sector, since it is known from previous research that up-
ward mobility differs considerably between sectors (Eichhorst et al. 2005). This also 
applies to job and labour turnover rates (Davis/Haltiwanger 1999), which should 
affect the exit probabilities to unemployment. 
Beyond observed characteristics, exit behaviour can also be influenced by unob-
served heterogeneity, which may bias coefficients for worker and firm characteristics 
if it is not controlled for. It should be noted that heterogeneity in our sample is al-
ready reduced by focusing on males in the main working age, all entering low wage 
jobs out of unemployment. To take the remaining unobserved heterogeneity into 
account, we follow a strategy already adapted in other studies on job spells (e.g. 
Boockmann/Steffes 2005; Jahn 2008) and use information on individuals’ employ-
ment history of the past five years preceding any relevant job spell in our multivari-
ate analysis. This includes information on the frequency and length of employment 
and unemployment spells during these years. We expect that employment history is 
highly correlated with unobserved characteristics such as abilities, motivation and 
career orientation of individuals. Disregarding this information should lead to an 
overestimation of negative duration dependence, respectively an underestimation of 
positive duration dependence. 
Furthermore, we use two duration models that allow us to estimate size and direc-
tion of duration dependence - a parametric Weibull model and a piecewise constant 
proportional hazards model. Hazard rates are not constant over time, but vary with 
the duration of the spell, so there is duration dependence. The pattern of duration 
dependence for the two exits yields important information. From empirical studies of 
job spells it is well known that hazard rates, regardless of the specified exit, tend to 
fall over time, so there is negative duration dependence (Farber 1999), and this pat-
tern also appears in our spell sample (see below). However, this is not necessarily 
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“true” (or genuine) negative duration dependence18
Let us consider the pattern for exits to higher-wage jobs. “True” negative duration 
dependence would contradict the “bridge” argument, because if upward mobility is 
mainly based on the acquisition or re-activation of human capital over time, its prob-
ability should increase with spell length. However, if discouragement and persis-
tence effects prevail over time, we should observe negative duration dependence. 
, which would imply that exit 
probabilities of individuals decrease over time, but this may also be due to worker 
heterogeneity: Individuals with high exit probabilities tend to leave the sample more 
quickly than those with low exit probabilities, thus the share of the latter increases 
over time. In the case of transitions to higher-wage jobs, well-motivated, highly 
skilled individuals are likely to make this transition earlier than individuals with “unfa-
vourable” characteristics, so the latter make up a growing part of the sample over 
time (Stewart/Swaffield 1999). Regarding the exit to unemployment, persons with 
“unfavourable” characteristics tend to make this transition earlier, and the “better” 
individuals with low exit probabilities tend to remain longer in the sample. In both 
cases, the spell sample displays falling hazard rates, although individual exit prob-
abilities need not necessarily decrease, which would be “true” duration dependence. 
In our case, it is interesting to identify the extent of “true” dependence, because it 
provides further information on the question whether low-wage jobs serve as a 
bridge or a trap. 
For exits to unemployment, positive duration dependence is to be expected at the 
beginning of spells; this however is a general feature of job spells, regardless of the 
wage level, and can be explained by the fact that match quality for a new job match 
is uncertain at the beginning. As job duration increases, both employers and work-
ers obtain more information on match quality. So the exit probability rises in the first 
months, as matches with low quality are terminated (Jovanovic 1979). 
Furthermore, we expect that for exits to unemployment, duration patterns at the be-
ginning should be different in Germany and Austria. In Germany there is a legal pro-
bationary period at the beginning of a new employment relationship, which usually 
lasts six months. During this time both parties can terminate the contract at will. Af-
terwards the legal dismissal protection applies, which makes layoffs more difficult 
and costly for the employer. Therefore exits should be more frequent in the first half 
year and decline thereafter. This pattern should be less pronounced in Austria, 
where the probationary period is shorter (usually one month), and employment pro-
tection is less strict afterwards. However, small firms in Germany with less than 5 
                                               
18  The terms “state dependence” and “duration dependence” are sometimes used inter-
changeably (e.g. by Heckman 1991), although they are not completely synonymous. Du-
ration dependence implies that the length of time spent in a particular state influences the 
exit probability, whereas state dependence means that being in a particular state influ-
ences the exit probability, regardless of the time spent in this state. See Cappellari et al. 
(2007). However it is reasonable to assume that negative duration dependence is associ-
ated with negative state dependence, and vice versa. 
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resp. 10 employees are (or were) exempt from legal dismissal protection laws19
It is again interesting to analyse whether in case of exiting into unemployment 
hump-shaped hazard rates really reflect true negative duration dependence. This 
would suggest that low wage jobs at least partly favour employment integration. 
, so 
duration patterns for small firms should be more similar between both countries. 
7 Descriptive evidence on low-wage employment dynamics 
In a first step, we turn to the low-wage incidence of our target group in a cross-
sectional perspective (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix). The ratio of low paid 
men, as a percentage of all West German men aged 25-54 and working full-time, 
has risen continuously from 4.2 %, in 1990, to 9 % in 200420. In Austria the ratio of 
low paid men rose from 4 % in 1998 to 5 % in 2006. But the underlying low-wage 
threshold is lower in Austria than in Germany: In Austria monthly earnings equiva-
lent to the low-wage threshold amount to 1,380 € in 2001, compared with 1,710 € in 
Germany. In spite of a similar GDP per capita (25,700 € in Germany and 26,400 € in 
Austria in the year 200121
Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix) give a broad idea of the aggregate dynamics of low-paid 
employment in both countries. The tables show pooled year-to-year transition rates 
between low-paid and better-paid employment and unemployment. Included are 
men aged 25-54 who could be observed in two consecutive years, on November 1st, 
as either unemployed or full-time employed. In the latter case we distinguish be-
tween low-wage and higher-wage employment. 
), median wages (and thus also the low wage threshold) 
exhibit considerable differences. 
The numbers illustrate a considerable degree of low wage persistence and similar 
findings for Austria and Germany: Of those low paid in year t, more than two thirds 
(69.8 % in Austria, 67.4 % in Germany) remain in low-wage employment one year 
later, whereas only 20.2 % of them are found in higher-wage employment in Ger-
many, and 19.6 % in Austria. We also find evidence for a low-wage-no-wage cycle: 
Of the low paid in year t, 12.9 % are unemployed in (t+1) in Germany and 12.0 % in 
Austria, so they face a much higher (unconditional) risk of unemployment than those 
in higher-wage employment (Germany 2 %, Austria 3.1 %). However, low-wage 
earners in t have a clearly higher probability of being in employment in the next year, 
compared to the unemployed. This holds for both countries. 
                                               
19  The threshold for the application of dismissal protection was changed several times since 
the 90s: From 1996 to 1998, and again since 2004, firms with less than 11 employees 
were (or are) exempt. Between 1999 and 2003, the threshold was lowered to 6 employ-
ees (in full-time equivalents). 
20  Note that the low wage threshold (two thirds of the median wage) is calculated on the 
basis of all dependent full-time workers (men and women) aged 18-60 in West Germany 
and Austria, respectively. 
21  Values that control for purchasing power parities widen the gap between Austria and 
Germany slightly. 
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When looking at the unemployed in year t in Germany, we observe a higher prob-
ability to move to higher-wage jobs (12.9 %) than to low-wage jobs (7.8 %); but this 
does not contradict the existence of a low-wage-no-wage cycle, since almost 93 % 
of full-time employed men during the period 1998-2004 were in better-paid jobs (see 
Figure 1 in the Appendix). These results are even more pronounced in the Austrian 
case: 26.9 % of unemployed had a higher-wage job the next year, whereas only 
10.6 % are found in a full-time low-wage job. 
Despite many similarities, one important difference between Germany and Austria 
can be observed: In Germany, the low-paid are more likely to have a high-wage job 
in the next year (20.2 %) than the unemployed (12.9 %). This is not the case in Aus-
tria. So for an Austrian unemployed is seems to be a good strategy to decline a low-
wage job offer and wait for a better-paid job. However, this conclusion may be mis-
leading, as all the transition probabilities displayed in Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix) are 
unconditional probabilities, not taking into account individual heterogeneity. 
We now turn to the spell sample resulting from inflows into low-wage employment 
out of unemployment.  As shown in Table 3 (Appendix), in Germany more than 76 % 
of all males had only one spell in the period under investigation, whereas in Austria 
more than half of all males in the sample had two or more spells during this time. So 
a low-pay-no-pay cycle seems to play a greater role in Austria. 
Table 4 (Appendix) provides some more information regarding the characteristics of 
people in low wage jobs. Younger males, aged 25-34, are found most frequently, 
making up between 40 and 50 % of the spell sample. Low skilled males make up 
24 % of all inflows in Germany and even 34.8 % in Austria, which means that they 
are clearly over-represented in the sample22. The medium skilled constitute the bulk 
of all inflows in the sample, whereas the high skilled are only a small minority in the 
sample. With regard to skill level, “low” refers to at most a lower secondary degree. 
“Medium” corresponds to a completed vocational training, mostly in the dual appren-
ticeship system that is prevalent in both countries, whereas “high” corresponds to a 
university degree, also including “Fachhochschulen” (universities of applied sci-
ences). Unfortunately, the German data contain a relatively high share of males with 
unknown formal education level23
 Not surprisingly, low wage jobs are more likely in small and medium-sized firms, 
particularly in Austria. As to the sectoral distribution, the high share of hotels and 
. However, we were able to reduce this share to 
3.8 % by applying an imputation procedure developed for the education variable in 
the IABS (Fitzenberger et al. 2005). 
                                               
22  Of all employed men aged 25-54, only 11 % (Germany) and 13 % (Austria) were low 
skilled, according to the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (figures for 2001). 
23  This is due to the fact that the IABS data is not provided by the employee himself, but by 
the employer, who not always has reliable information on the formal educational attain-
ment of each of his/her employees, especially in the case of non-German workers. 
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restaurants (almost 22 %) in Austria stands out, reflecting the great importance of 
tourism-related activities for this country. Even more salient is the fact that in Ger-
many, one quarter of all low wage jobs were offered by temporary work agencies, 
while temp work played only a minor role for higher-wage spells in Germany (Table 
5 in the Appendix), as well as for both types of spells in Austria. This is probably due 
to stricter employment protection rules in Germany. In general, higher-wage jobs 
had also a higher skill level and were more likely to be found in larger firms, as can 
be seen from a comparison between Tables 4 and 5 (Appendix). 
Tables 6 and 7 (Appendix) provide information on the exits of low-wage spells in 
absolute numbers as well as in percentages that can be interpreted as exit probabili-
ties. The first two rows contain aggregate numbers. Of the 52,805 spells for West 
Germany, 43.54 % ended in unemployed again, compared to only 18.8 % who fi-
nally crossed the low-wage threshold. In Austria even 55.5 % were registered as 
unemployed afterwards and only 17.9 % took up a full time job with higher wages. 
This again seems to confirm the existence of a low-wage-no-wage cycle. 29.6 % of 
all exits in Germany are classified as “other” (see above), more than in Austria 
(23.7 %). Only a small minority of the low-wage spells persisted up to the end of the 
sample period (8.2 % in Germany, 2.9 % in Austria). 
Tables 6 and 7 (Appendix) also present a breakdown of the spells according to skill 
level and age. From human capital theory, we expect that higher-skilled persons 
have better chances to end up in higher-wage employment. This expectation is con-
firmed in both countries (see column 2), whereas their risk to return to unemploy-
ment is lower (see first column). 
When looking at different age groups, exit probabilities to higher-paid jobs decrease 
with age. This is in line with the well-known fact that age-earnings profiles are clearly 
steeper for the younger. Exit rates to unemployment tend to rise slightly with age, 
which is surprising, since previous studies on job durations (e.g. Wolff 2004) have 
shown that job spells of young workers end up more often in unemployment. This 
indicates that dynamics among low wage earners are different. 
In Tables 8 and 9 (Appendix) we present additional information on the mean dura-
tion (measured in weeks) of low wage spells ending in unemployment and in higher-
paid employment, respectively. In Germany, the mean duration of spells ending in 
unemployment was 38.3 weeks, considerably shorter than for spells ending in bet-
ter-paid employment (49.4).24
                                               
24  For those who managed to cross the low-wage threshold, we analysed the durations of 
these subsequent better-paid employment spells. The mean durations of these spells are 
fairly long (110 weeks). This suggests that upward wage mobility leads to more employ-
ment stability. 
 For both groups, mean durations in Austria were 
shorter, reflecting higher labour turnover in Austria. When looking at the breakdown 
according to educational attainment, there are only small differences in durations 
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with regard to spells ending in unemployment, but spells ending in higher-wage em-
ployment are considerably shorter for the higher skilled in both countries, as one 
would expect. With regard to age, no major differences in mean durations can be 
found between the three age groups. 
As mentioned above, the descriptive results seem to confirm the relevance of a low-
wage-no-wage cycle. The share of workers returning to unemployment is much 
higher than the share of those finding higher wage employment and the share of 
those persisting in low-wage jobs (right censored spells). 
The results for higher-wage spells, presented in Tables 10 and 11 (Appendix), are 
not immediately comparable to those for low wage spells described before, because 
the exit destinations are defined differently: While a considerable share of low-wage 
spells end in higher-wage employment, transitions from higher wage employment 
into low wage (full-time) employment are marginal. Low-wage spells may end in 
higher-wage employment when wages rise sufficiently whereas higher-wage spells 
merely continue. Therefore, we observe high wage spells on average for a longer 
time-period and thus the probability of observing unemployment as a destination of 
an ending spell should be higher for higher-wage than for low-wage spells. 
Nevertheless, it comes as a surprise that, compared to low-wage spells, even more 
high-wage spells end in unemployment again (50.2 % in West Germany, 72.1 % in 
Austria). Again, the data for Austria show a higher fluctuation: Not only the higher 
transition rates to unemployment but also the lower share of right-censored spells 
confirm this general observation. Additionally we observe longer mean durations of 
higher wage spells returning to unemployment in Germany than in Austria. 
To get more insight into the transitions, a look at the baseline hazard rates is useful. 
Figures 3 and 4 (Appendix) plot baseline hazard rates for transitions from low wage 
into higher wage employment. The shape of the functions is similar in both coun-
tries: They decline over time, so the conditional probability of getting a better-paid 
job diminishes over time. As to transitions from low wage jobs to unemployment 
(Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix), hazard rates first increase, possibly as the result 
of separations because job matches turned out to be bad. Then, still before the end 
of the first year (= 52 weeks), hazard rates start to decline. Although the shape of 
the functions is similar in both countries, hazard rates are higher in Austria, espe-
cially in the first year and a half, reflecting higher low-pay-no-pay mobility. Figures 7 
and 8 (Appendix) display hazard rates from higher wage employment to unemploy-
ment. The hazards resemble those in Figures 5 and 6 (Appendix), but at a lower 
level, meaning that conditional probabilities of falling back into unemployment are 
lower for the better-paid than for the low-paid. But again the level of the hazard rates 
is higher in Austria. 
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8 Econometric method and results 
In this section we analyse low-wage spells started out of unemployment in more 
depth with duration analysis in a multivariate setting. Since the unit of measurement 
in both datasets is days, we can apply duration models that allow for continuous 
time. We use models with the exits “unemployment” and “higher wage” as inde-
pendent competing risks. For this purpose we create a single-spell sample: if a male 
had more than one low-wage spell between 1998 and 2003 (2004), we selected one 
spell at random. The competing risk model implies that all other exits, such as part-
time work or inactivity, are considered as censored. We estimated three different 
models: First, a semi-parametric proportional hazard model that allows to estimate 
the influence of various covariates on exit behaviour; second, a parametric Weibull 
model, and third, a piecewise constant exponential model. The latter two models 
have the advantage that they allow to directly estimate the extent of duration de-
pendence. However, the Weibull model is based on relatively strong assumptions 
concerning the shape of the duration function that are not easily justified in our con-
text. The piecewise constant model is more flexible in this regard, since it allows the 
hazard rate to vary between specified time periods, but assumes that hazards are 
constant within each period25. The hazard rate is specified as follows: 
 
is a constant for each transition from status j to status k, associated with the 
time period l.  is a row vector of covariates, and  is an associated vector 
of coefficients assumed not to vary between periods26
It should be mentioned that the results were similar between the three models as 
regards the sign and size of coefficients for the covariates. Therefore we report only 
the estimation results for the piecewise constant model (see Tables 12 and 13 in the 
Appendix). 
. For our analysis we chose 
six months as time interval for each period. This is justified by the fact that many 
contracts end (or are renewed) after six, twelve or eighteen months, given legal pe-
riods of notice and/or usual time periods for fixed-term contracts. 
Transition to higher wage jobs 
The estimation results for transitions into higher-paid jobs can be found in column 
(1) of Tables 12 (Appendix) (Germany) and 13 (Appendix) (Austria). The coefficients 
for personal characteristics are displayed first. Contrary to expectations, being for-
eign does not affect upward mobility negatively; just on the contrary, coefficients are 
                                               
25  For the Weibull and the piecewise constant model we plotted graphs of pseudoresiduals, 
indicating that the piecewise constant model yields the better “fit”. However, such plots 
should not be understood as goodness-of-fit tests in a strict sense, but only provide hints 
for model selection (Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002). 
26  This description of the model follows Blossfeld/Rohwer (2002), pp.120-121. 
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even significantly positive for EU-15-foreigners in Germany and Non-EU-15-for-
eigners in Austria, although the size of the effect is modest. In both countries, the 
younger age groups and the better skilled realise faster transitions to higher-paid 
jobs. This is in line with expectations and confirms the results of the descriptive 
analysis. 
The coefficients for sectors are listed next. Compared to the manufacturing sector, 
which serves as reference category, upward mobility is significantly lower in hotels 
and restaurants. This can be explained by the fact that the average duration of em-
ployment spells is relatively short in this sector, due to high seasonal variations. 
Therefore, the chance for a transition into higher wage is low, compared to other 
industries. The same applies to the primary sector. 
Compared to manufacturing, upward mobility is higher in the construction sector 
and, most notably, for temp agency workers – remember that they make up a quar-
ter of all low-wage spells in Germany. This may come as a surprise, as temp agency 
workers are mostly paid lower wages, and these wages are usually pre-defined and 
fixed for the time they are working in a given employing firm. Nevertheless, they may 
get higher wages either by changing the employing firm or by getting a contract di-
rectly with the employing firm. Our sample does not allow analysing the question in 
more detail, but in any case this evidence deserves further attention. At this point, it 
should also be noted that the risk of falling back into unemployment is also higher 
for temp agency workers (column (2)). 
With regard to firm size, the results show that smaller firms provide lower chances to 
leave a low wage job for a higher wage job in both countries, as expected. This find-
ing is in line with the results presented in Mosthaf et al. (2010) and Gürtzgen/ 
Heinze (2010) for Germany. By contrast, firm age only plays a minor role for upward 
mobility, and the effect is only significant in Austria27
Besides sector, firm size and age, average earnings within the firm are of impor-
tance - there are typical “low-wage firms” with low average earnings which offer less 
better-paid jobs. As expected, upward mobility is lower when spells are started in 
such firms, and this effect is highly significant in both countries. Moreover, promotion 
chances may depend not only on average earnings, but also on the wage dispersion 
within the firm. We cannot directly observe this dispersion in both datasets, so we 
use the share of low skilled workers, who usually earn less, as a proxy. Conditional 
on average earnings, we could expect that a higher share of low skilled workers is 
associated with higher wage dispersion and, as a consequence, better chances of 
transitions to higher pay, and this is the case indeed in Germany, but not in Austria. 
. So the expectation that young 
firms with high labour turnover offer less promotion chances is not confirmed. 
                                               
27  Note that for Austria significance levels are often higher and standard errors are lower 
than for Germany, also because the Austrian sample is larger than the German one. 
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As a further control we have included the distance of the individual wage at the be-
ginning of the spell from the low wage threshold. It is obvious that crossing the 
threshold is easier and realised more quickly if the wage is only slightly below. This 
is confirmed for both countries by the highly significant coefficient with the expected 
negative sign. 
As mentioned earlier, we have also included information on the individual employ-
ment history prior to the job spell. The results are also shown in Tables 12 and 13 
(Appendix). To sum up, less attachment to employment in the three years preceding 
the low wage job is associated with lower upward mobility. One should, however, 
refrain from interpreting these coefficients as causal effects, since they are likely to 
be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics, but it is useful to include 
them in order to take unobserved heterogeneity into account. Nevertheless, the 
dummy variable for recalls deserves special attention. Remember that 16 % of all 
spells in Germany and 33 % in Austria are recalls, i.e. low-wage earners are em-
ployed by the same firm repeatedly. In both countries the coefficient is clearly nega-
tive, meaning that recalled low-wage workers are less likely to get better-paid jobs. 
A plausible explanation for this is that they are hired, laid off and hired again by firms 
with fluctuating labour demand, and each time they fulfil the same task within the 
firm. This constitutes a special variant of a low-pay-no-pay cycle, which is likely to 
be based on a mutual implicit agreement between employer and worker, so unem-
ployment is endogenous in this case. 
Transition to unemployment 
The transition to unemployment is analysed not only for low-wage spells (column 2 
of Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix), but also for the higher wage sample (column 3). 
Looking at the results we find that being foreign has only a weak influence on the 
risk of falling back into unemployment for both groups of workers in both countries. 
In Austria non-EU foreigners have a somewhat lower risk of falling back into unem-
ployment. This result may reflect the importance of seasonal migration behaviour 
created by the demand for unskilled workers in the tourism as well as construction 
industries.28
With regard to age, the descriptive evidence has shown that older low-wage workers 
run a higher risk of returning to unemployment. This result is not confirmed in the 
multivariate analysis, at least for Germany. In Austria the age-specific coefficients 
are significant, but the size of the effect is only minor. The age effect is more pro-
nounced for higher-wage workers in both countries. The same applies to the skill 
level - the effect is a bit more pronounced in the case of better-paid workers. 
 Interestingly, foreigners from EU-15 countries do experience a higher 
transition rate into unemployment in Austria. 
                                               
28  In this respect, the higher risk to exit low-wage jobs into "other" positions (including leav-
ing the Austrian labour market) has to be noted. 
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As to sector-specific effects, we would expect a reversal of sign when comparing 
transitions to higher wage and to unemployment. This is the case indeed in many 
sectors, as for example in the primary sector or in hotels and restaurants, where 
low-wage workers in both countries have lower upward mobility (column 1) and a 
higher risk of returning to unemployment, compared to the reference category 
(manufacturing). However, the construction sector and temp work agencies are ex-
ceptions to this rule: Low wage workers have higher transition rates to unemploy-
ment, but also to better-paid jobs. This indicates a marked dualism in both sectors: 
Many workers either move up to better payment or get unemployed again, but rela-
tively few persist in low wage jobs. 
The effect of firm size on transitions in both countries is as expected: The smaller 
the firm, the higher the exit risk to unemployment. This effect is even more pro-
nounced for higher-wage workers. By contrast, firm age plays only a minor role. 
As to the role of the previous employment history, we again focus on the influence of 
recalls. Being a recalled worker increases the transition probability to unemployment 
by roughly one quarter. This seems to confirm the conclusion drawn above regard-
ing this special kind of low-pay-no-pay cycle for recalled workers. However, the ef-
fect is even stronger in the case of better-paid workers, so this seems not to be a 
peculiarity of low-wage workers. 
Taken the above-mentioned characteristics together, the coefficients for low-paid 
and for high-paid workers mostly have the same sign and are similar in magnitude, 
suggesting that the employment dynamics of the two groups are comparable. 
The role of unobserved heterogeneity 
As already mentioned, the information on the individual employment history is in-
cluded in the empirical model to take unobserved heterogeneity into account. One 
may ask whether this is sufficient enough to get unbiased results for the other vari-
ables and for the influence of duration dependence (see below). Although it is diffi-
cult to rule out this eventuality completely, there is at least the possibility to check for 
this by running a so-called frailty model, assuming a gamma-distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity (cf. Blossfeld/Rohwer 2002, chapter 10). We have done this for the 
estimations presented in Table 12 (Appendix). The results were very similar to the 
previous estimations, and the estimate for the variance of the mixing gamma distri-
bution that should indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity was insignifi-
cant in all cases. 
Duration dependence 
As previously discussed, in particular for policy implications it is important to esti-
mate the effects of duration dependence. In the piecewise constant exponential 
model, this information is provided by the baseline hazards. If the coefficients de-
crease (increase) significantly with spell length, there is negative (positive) duration 
dependence. 
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The coefficients for the baseline hazards are displayed at the bottom of Tables 12 
and 13 (Appendix). As to transitions to higher wage (column 1), we observe that 
coefficients tend to decrease from the second period (6-12 months) to the last pe-
riod displayed here (30-36 months); this points to negative duration dependence; 
however, in the German sample standard errors are too high to reject the hypothesis 
that there is no true duration dependence and that decreasing transition rates to 
higher wage employment are mainly due to sorting effects. The comparison of the 
estimates obtained for transition probabilities into unemployment depending on the 
wage level (columns 2 and 3) also reveals interesting results. Here there is evidence 
for negative duration dependence for low wage as well as for higher wage workers 
in both countries, indicating that the risk of failure decreases with time. This sug-
gests that even low wage workers can accumulate job-related human capital over 
time protecting them from being dismissed again. The effect is particularly strong 
after 12 and 24 months, suggesting that each additional year spent in employment 
reduces the risk of falling back into unemployment considerably. 
9 Conclusions 
Can low-wage jobs for the unemployed provide a bridge to better-paid jobs or at 
least stable employment integration? We have investigated this question using 
German and Austrian datasets that provide very accurate information on past labour 
market experiences as well as the duration of current low wage jobs. 
On an aggregate level, we show that low wage persistence exists on a great scale. 
At the same time, low wage earners face higher risks of getting trapped in a low pay 
– no pay cycle, since the chances of being unemployed one year later are much 
higher for people in low wage jobs. However, low-wage jobs still seem to offer better 
labour market prospects compared to being in unemployment. These results are 
similar for both countries and are in line with those for other European countries. 
The descriptive evidence shows that a high share of low-wage spells started out of 
unemployment end again in unemployment. This share is considerably higher in 
Austria than in Germany, pointing at the high labour turnover in this country. This 
also applies to fluctuations between unemployment and higher-wage employment. 
The importance of industries with highly seasonal employment patterns as well as 
the frequent utilisation of temporary lay-offs that appear in the unemployment regis-
ter may be factors explaining this difference. So the better overall labour market 
situation in Austria did not favour more durable employment spells, nor higher up-
ward mobility. 
The baseline hazard of returning into unemployment is higher for low-wage spells 
than for higher-wage spells in both countries. Nevertheless, in the medium-term 
even more higher-wage spells end in unemployment. These findings seem to be 
contradictory, but can be explained by longer durations of higher-wage spells. In 
sum, there is no convincing evidence for a distinct low-pay-no-pay cycle, since 
movements between higher pay and no pay also seem to be of great relevance. 
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As to the determinants of upward mobility for low-wage earners, the multivariate 
duration model confirms the positive influence of being younger and better skilled, 
as expected. Moreover, sector, firm size and average earnings within the firm allow 
identifying typical “low-wage” firms offering poor promotion prospects. In this con-
text, the results for temp agency workers are particularly surprising, especially for 
West Germany, where these workers make up one quarter of all inflows into low-
wage jobs.  
The coefficients for the individual employment history show that less attachment to 
employment in the past is associated with lower upward mobility; however, this 
should not be interpreted as a causal effect. In what concerns duration dependence, 
we find, at least for Germany, no convincing evidence for “true” duration depend-
ence, so decreasing transition rates are mainly due to sorting effects. 
The analysis of the transitions of low-wage and higher-wage workers to unemploy-
ment shows that the influence of personal and firm-related characteristics is often 
similar for both groups. Age, skill level and nationality matter only to a limited de-
gree, whereas firm-related characteristics (sector, firm size) play a greater role. The 
highly significant coefficients for recalls reveal that there is a special segment of 
workers frequently changing between employment and unemployment, not limited to 
low-wage workers, and this kind of “cycle” is presumably based often on an implicit 
agreement between firm and worker. This is particularly important in Austria, given 
the high share of recalls among low-and higher-wage workers in this country. As to 
the influence of duration dependence, we find evidence that decreasing hazard 
rates to unemployment persist in the multivariate duration model for both groups of 
workers. This suggests that even low-wage workers can accumulate job-related 
human capital that favours employment integration over time. 
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Appendix 
Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 
Year-to-year transitions of males aged 25-54 between unemployment and full-time 
employment, pooled data for 1998-2004 (West Germany) 
 
Status in year (t+1)  
Higher wage Low wage Unemployment Total 
Status in year (t)     
Higher wage 96.6 1.2 2.3 100.0 
Low wage 20.2 67.4 12.4 100.0 
Unemployment 12.9 7.8 79.3 100.0 
Total 84.9 5.7 9.4 100.0 
Total number of observations: 1,023,569. Figures in each cell are percentage shares. 
Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Table 2 
Year-to-year transitions of males aged 25-54 between unemployment and full-time 
employment, pooled data for 1998-2003 (Austria) 
 
Status in (t+1)  
Higher wage Low wage Unemployment Total 
Status in year (t)     
Higher wage 95.9 1.2 3.0 100.0 
Low wage 19.6 69.8 10.6 100.0 
Unemployment 26.9 10.6 62.5 100.0 
Total 86.6 6.0 7.4 100.0 
Total number of observations: 6,662,637. Figures in each cell are percentage shares. 
Source: Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
 
 
Table 3 
Number of low wage spells per male, started out of unemployment between 
1998-2004 (West Germany) and 1998-2003 (Austria) 
 West Germany Austria 
1 spell 76.1 46.5 
2 spells 16.9 23.5 
3 spells 4.5 12.1 
4 or more spells 2.5 17.9 
Total number of spells: 24,160 (Germany); 160,483 (Austria); 
Total number of males: 17,876 (Germany); 74,777 (Austria) 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of low-wage spells 
Numbers are percentage shares of total number of spells 
 West Germany Austria 
Age 
25-34 47.5 41.7 
35-44 33.9 35.9 
45-54 18.6 22.5 
Skill level 
low 24.0 34.8 
medium 71.1 59.8 
high 1.1 5.5 
unknown 3.8 0.0 
Nationality 
native 82.2 78.8 
foreign EU-15 3.8 1.4 
foreign non-EU-15 14.0 19.8 
Size of firm (no. of employees) where spell started 
<6 19.7 34.5 
6 - 10 10.8 14.8 
11 – 25 15.2 16.7 
26 – 100 27.9 18.7 
101 – 250  13.7 7.7 
> 250 8.0 6.6 
unknown 4.6 0.0 
Sector where spell started 
primary 5.0 5.4 
manufacturing 13.8 9.7 
Mining, energy supply 0.2 0.2 
construction 10.5 11.3 
trade 12.2 15.4 
Hotels and restaurants 8.1 21.9 
Transport, storage and 
communication 9.6 12.2 
Finance and insurance 0.3 1.0 
Real estate, renting and 
business act. 10.8 9.2 
personal services etc. 4.0 8.0 
Temp work agencies 25.0 3.4 
Other or unknown 0.5 2.5 
Recall* 
yes 15.9 33.1 
no 84.1 66.9 
Total number of spells: 24,160 (Germany); 160,483 (Austria) 
* Recall = Person in low wage job had been employed by the same firm in the past. 
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Table 5 
Characteristics of higher-wage spells 
Numbers are percentage shares of total number of spells 
 West Germany Austria 
Age 
25-34 40.6 40.2 
35-44 37.0 37.0 
45-54 22.4 22.8 
Skill level 
low 10.5 23.3 
medium 81.9 71.3 
high 6.1 5.4 
unknown 1.5 0.0 
Nationality 
native 90.6 83.3 
foreign EU-15 2.4 1.0 
foreign non-EU-15 7.1 15.8 
Size of firm (no. of employees) where spell started 
<6 16.5 13.1 
6 - 10 13.9 12.8 
11 – 25 21.3 20.6 
26 – 100 24.9 27.9 
101 – 250  9.8 12.3 
> 250 11.4 13.3 
unknown 2.4 0.0 
Sector where spell started 
primary 3.5 1.8 
manufacturing 28.1 14.4 
Mining, energy supply 0.6 1.1 
construction 31.9 43.4 
trade 11.7 9.7 
Hotels and restaurants 1.9 9.0 
Transport, storage and 
communication 8.1 7.4 
Finance and insurance 0.9 0.5 
Real estate, renting and 
business act. 8.4 4.7 
personal services etc. 2.2 1.8 
Temp work agencies 2.7 2.5 
Other or unknown 0.3 4.1 
Recall* 
yes 20.7 57.0 
no 79.3 43.0 
Total number of spells: 52,805 (Germany); 828,480 (Austria) 
* Recall = Person in higher wage job had been employed by the same firm in the past. 
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Table 6 
Exits of low-wage spells (West Germany) 
Numbers are percentage shares of total number of spells in each row 
 Exits 
Right censored Total  Unemployment Higher Wage Other 
      
All 43.5 18.8 29.6 8.2 100.0 
      
Skill level      
Low 45.5 14.6 31.6 8.3 100.0 
Medium 42.7 20.5 29.0 7.8 100.0 
High 33.5 28.2 24.4 13.9 100.0 
      
Age      
25-34 41.6 20.3 30.9 7.2 100.0 
35-44 44.3 18.6 28.5 8.6 100.0 
45-54 47.0 15.0 28.0 10.9 100.0 
      
Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Table 7 
Exits of low-wage spells (Austria) 
Numbers are percentage shares of total number of spells in each row 
 Exits 
Right censored  Total  Unemployment Higher Wage Other 
      
All 55.5 17.9 23.7 2.9 100.0 
      
Skill level      
Low 54.2 16.7 26.2 2.9 100.0 
Medium 56.9 18.2 22.1 2.8 100.0 
High 48.3 23.0 25.0 3.7 100.0 
      
Age      
25-34 51.4 20.8 25.6 2.3 100.0 
35-44 56.7 17.0 23.2 3.1 100.0 
45-54 61.3 14.2 20.8 3.7 100.0 
      
Source: Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 1/2011 33 
Table 8 
Mean durations of low-wage spells (in weeks) 
(West Germany) 
 Exits 
 Unemployment Higher Wage 
All 38.3 49.4 
   
Skill Level   
Low 39.6 54.1 
Medium 37.7 48.5 
High 38.7 37.4 
   
Age   
25-34 37.3 49.1 
35-44 38.3 49.1 
45-54 40.6 50.8 
   
Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Table 9 
Mean durations of low-wage spells (in weeks) 
(Austria) 
 Exits 
 Unemployment Higher Wage 
All 32.7 39.9 
   
Skill Level   
Low 33.2 37.6 
Medium 32.3 40.3 
High 34.0 47.4 
   
Age   
25-34 32.1 39.6 
35-44 32.8 39.6 
45-54 33.6 41.4 
   
Source: Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
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Table 10 
Inflows into higher-wage jobs (above low-wage threshold) out of unemploy-
ment and destination state (West Germany) 
 Exits Right  
censored Total  Unemployment Low Wage Other 
All (as percentage 
of all spells) 50.2% 8.5% 21.9% 19.5% 100.0% 
      
Median duration 
(in weeks) 57.2 85.1 - - - 
Total number of spells: 52,805 
Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. Mean durations are measured in weeks. 
 
 
Table 11 
Inflows into higher-wage jobs (above low-wage threshold) out of unemploy-
ment and destination state (Austria) 
 Exits Right  
censored Total  Unemployment Low Wage Other 
All (as percentage 
of all spells) 72.1% 2.8% 14.8% 10.3% 100.0% 
      
Median duration 
(in weeks) 49.0 63.3 - - - 
Total number of spells: 828,480 
Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. Mean durations are measured in weeks. 
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Table 12 
Piecewise constant exponential model, West Germany (continued on next page) 
 Low wage spells Higher-wage spells 
 Exit: higher wage Exit: unemployment Exit: unemployment 
Personal characteristics: (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign: EU 15 .189 (.095)* -.105 (.073) -.109 (.061) ‡ 
Foreign: Non-EU-15 -.021 (.056)  -.034 (040) -.021 (.037) 
Age 25-34 .366 (.051)**  .003 (.036) -.202 (.025)** 
Age 35-44  .243 (.054)**  .001 (.037) -.084 (.024)** 
Medium skill level .253 (.047)** -.041 (.032) -.122 (.031)** 
Higher skill level .531 (.137)** -.209 (.129) -.278 (.054)** 
Firm related characteristics:    
Primary sector -.377 (.132)** .378 (.065)** .387 (.054)** 
Mining, energy supply -.364 (.580) .733 (.253)** .365 (.120)** 
construction .167 (.076)* .414 (.053)** .484 (.026)** 
trade -.034 (.062) -.083 (.052) -.091 (.033)** 
Hotels and restaurants -.348 (.110)** .142 (.062)* .365 (.069)** 
Transport, storage and communication -.039 (.067) -.207 (.057)** -.184 (.040)** 
Finance and insurance .229 (.293) .310 (.239) .008 (.104) 
Real estate, renting and business activities .054 (.068) -.071 (.055) -.003 (.039) 
Personal and cultural services -.133 (.107) .054 (.072) .146 (.064)* 
Temporary work agencies .516 (.060)** .109 (.049)* .144 (.061)* 
Firm size: 1-5 employees -.424 (.128)** .319 (.121)** .509 (.060)** 
Firm size: 6-10 employees -.346 (.130)** .227 (.122) ‡ .463 (.060)** 
Firm size: 11-25 employees -.323 (.124)** .247 (.120)* .366 (.057)** 
Firm size: 26-100 employees -.180 (.118) .177 (.117) .203 (.056)** 
Firm size: 101-250 employees -.130 (.120) .132 (.119) .027 (.060) 
Firm size: 251-1000 employees -.214 (.128) .180 (.125) .005 (.062) 
Firm age: < 1 year .094 (.059) .061 (.042) -.061 (.038) 
Firm age: 1-2 years .088 (.064) .068 (.047) .014 (.042) 
Average earnings per worker in firm .017 (.001)** .009 (.001)** -.005 (.001)** 
Share of low skilled employees in firm .294 (.075)** .117 (.054)** .078 (.050) 
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Table 12 – continued 
 Low wage spells Higher-wage spells 
 Exit: higher wage Exit: unemployment Exit: unemployment 
Distance of individual wage from low wage threshold: -.053 (.003)** .013 (.002)** .001 (.001) 
Macro trend indicators:    
National unemployment rate in year of spell start .145 (.025)** -.081 (.020)** -.208 (.013)** 
National employment growth in year of spell start (as percentage 
change to previous year) 16.22 (1.32)** -6.72 (1.00)** -10.86 (.718)** 
Controls for individual employment history before spell start:    
More than two unemployment spells within last three years (dummy)l -.046 (.044) .205 (.031)** .463 (.024)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: less than 2  -.150 (.061)* -.160 (.046)** -.264 (.033)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: 2 -.138 (.059)* -.161 (.045)** -.176 (.032)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: 3 -.084 (.063) -.074 (.046) -.039 (.031) 
Cumulated duration of employment in year preceding spell start -.019 (.007)** -.001 (.006) -.017 (.004)** 
Cumulated duration of unemployment in year before last year  
preceding spell start -.001 (.001) .005 (.001)** .008 (.001)** 
No wage earnings in year preceding spell start (dummy) .102 (.063) -.062 (.045) -.114 (.037)** 
Total wage earnings in year preceding spell start .000 (.000)** -.000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Recall (dummy) -.406 (.067)** .250 (.040)** .281 (.024)** 
Baseline hazards:    
0 - < 6 months -7.660 (.297)** -4.802 (.243)** -3.276 (.152)** 
6 - < 12 months -7.330 (.297)** -4.834 (.244)** -2.744 (.153)** 
12 - < 18 months -7.845 (.300)** -5.499 (.247)** -3.880 (.155)** 
18 - < 24 months -7.758 (.301)** -5.549 (.249)** -3.556 (.155)** 
24 - < 30 months -8.038 (.306)** -5.969 (.255)** -4.333 (.160)** 
30 - < 36 months -8.096 (.310)** -6.013 (.259)** -4.104 (.159)** 
No. of spells / No. of exits 15,374 / 3,347 15,374 / 5,923 30,282 / 11,945 
Log likelihood -9,277 -15,155 -31,525 
Notes: Reference categories: German citizenship; age group 45-54; low skilled; manufacturing sector; firms with more than 1000 employees; firm age > 2 years;  
more than three jobs within last 3 years. For further explanations, see main text. 
Significance levels: ‡: 10%, *: 5%, ** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 13 
Piecewise constant exponential model, Austria (continued on next page) 
 Low wage spells Higher-wage spells 
 Exit: higher wage Exit: unemployment Exit: unemployment 
Personal characteristics: (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign: EU 15 .082 (.068) .158 (.045)** .120 (.024)** 
Foreign: Non-EU-15 .126 (.023)** -.101 (.016)** -.058 (.008)** 
Age 25-34 .434 (.023)** -.056 (.014)** -.176 (.006)** 
Age 35-44  .229 (.024)** -.025 (.015) ‡ -.071 (.006)** 
Medium skill level .074 (.021)** -.001 (.014) .007 (.007) 
Higher skill level .192 (.033)** -.123 (.026)** -.211 (.012)** 
Firm related characteristics:    
Primary sector -.208 (.064)** .436 (.030)** .364 (.019)** 
Mining, energy supply .169 (.154) .144 (.121) .201 (.023)** 
construction .213 (.034)** .408 (.024)** .540 (.007)** 
trade -.014 (.027) -.080 (.022)** -.030 (.010)** 
Hotels and restaurants -.231 (.033)** .216 (.022)** .767 (.012)** 
Transport, storage and communication .189 (.031)** .017 (.024)** .059 (.011)** 
Finance and insurance .259 (.051)** -.089 (.061) -.325 (.036)** 
Real estate, renting and business activities .183 (.032)** .102 (.025)** .095 (.012)** 
Personal and cultural services -.058 (.038) .316 (.025)** .165 (.018)** 
Temporary work agencies .754 (.046)** .717 (.036)** .559 (.016)** 
Firm size: 1-5 employees -.257 (.032)** .309 (.024)** .524 (.010)** 
Firm size: 6-10 employees -.234 (.033)** .214 (.025)** .454 (.009)** 
Firm size: 11-25 employees -.141 (.030)** .126 (.024)** .377 (.008)** 
Firm size: 26-100 employees -.029 (.027) .061 (.023)** .267 (.008)** 
Firm size: 101-250 employees .051 (.031) -.017 (.028) .131 (.009)** 
Firm age: < 1 year .062 (.026)** -.011 (.017) .061 (.009)** 
Firm age: 1-2 years .082 (.031)** .030 (.020) .011 (.011) 
Median earnings per worker in firm .015 (.001)** .005 (.001)** -.004 (.000)** 
Share of low skilled employees in firm -.065(.051) .083 (.029)** .393 (.018)** 
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Table 13 – continued 
 Low wage spells Higher-wage spells 
 Exit: higher wage Exit: unemployment Exit: unemployment 
Distance of individual wage from low wage threshold: -.054 (.000)** -.006 (.001)** .000 (.000) ‡ 
Macro trend indicators:    
National unemployment rate in year of spell start -.038 (.018)* .161 (.012)** .081 (.005)** 
National employment growth in year of spell start (as percentage 
change to previous year) 
.165 (.028)** -.033 (.019) -.012 (.008) 
Controls for individual employment history before spell start:    
More than two unemployment spells within last three years (dummy)l -.027 (.223) .334 (.014)** .371 (.006)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: less than 2  -.175 (.043)** -.246 (.029)** -.321 (.021)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: 2 -.197 (.021)** -.333 (.016)** -.442 (.007)** 
No. of jobs within last 3 years: 3 -.060 (.021)** -.199 (.015)** -.241 (.007)** 
Cumulated duration of employment in year preceding spell start -.005 (.003)‡ -.007 (.002)** -.012 (.001)** 
Cumulated duration of unemployment in year before last year  
preceding spell start 
-.004 (.001)** .009 (.000)** .012 (.000)** 
No wage earnings in year preceding spell start (dummy) .181 (.035)** -.106 (.023)** -.231 (.015)** 
Total wage earnings in year preceding spell start .000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** 
Recall (dummy) -.397 (.023)** .269 (.014)** .473 (.006)** 
Baseline hazards:    
0 - < 6 months -5.730 (.134)** -5.956 (.095)** -6.135 (.042)** 
6 - < 12 months -5.602 (.135)** -5.533 (.095)** -4.816 (.042)** 
12 - < 18 months -6.133 (.136)** -6.586 (.097)** -6.541 (.043)** 
18 - < 24 months -6.021 (.137)** -6.720 (.099)** -5.887 (.042)** 
24 - < 30 months -6.424 (.140)** -7.055 (.102)** -6.844 (.044)** 
30 - < 36 months -6.379 (.141)** -7.087 (.103)** -6.287 (.043)** 
No. of spells / No. of exits 74,026 / 16,404 74,026 / 34017 331,318 / 187,882 
Log likelihood -46,537 -76,011 -364,023 
Notes: Reference categories: German citizenship; age group 45-54; low skilled; manufacturing sector; firms with more than 1000 employees; firm age > 2 years;  
more than three jobs within last 3 years. For further explanations, see main text. 
Significance levels: ‡: 10%, *: 5%, ** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1 
Incidence of low-wage work for West German males aged 25-54 in full-time jobs 
liable to social security (apprentices excluded), 1990-2004 
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Source: Own calculations, based on IABS. The low-wage threshold is calculated as two thirds of the median 
wage of all full-time employees liable to social security (men and women) aged 18-60 and working  
in West Germany. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Incidence of low-wage work for Austrian males aged 25-54 in full-time jobs liable 
to social security, 1998-2006 
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Source:  Own calculations, based on WIFO-INDI-DV. The low-wage threshold is calculated as two thirds of 
the median wage of all full-time employees liable to social security (men and women) aged 18-60 
and working in Austria. 
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Figure 3 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from low wage into higher wage employment 
(West Germany, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from low wage into higher wage employment 
(Austria, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
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Figure 5 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from low wage employment into unemploy-
ment (West Germany, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Figure 6 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from low wage employment into unemploy-
ment (Austria, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
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Figure 7 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from higher wage employment into unem-
ployment (West Germany, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on IABS. 
 
 
Figure 8 
Baseline hazard function: transition rates from higher wage employment into unem-
ployment (Austria, analysis time unit = weeks) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, based on WIFO INDI-DV. 
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